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ARTICLES

SHALL WE OVERCOME? TRANSCENDING
RACE, CLASS, AND IDEOLOGY THROUGH
INTEREST CONVERGENCE
SHERYLL D. CASHIN'
"[W]e believe that political relations are based on self-interest:
benefits to be gained and losses to be avoided. For the most part,
man's politics is determined by his evaluation of material good
and evil. Politics results from a conflict of interests, not of
consciences." 1
"The interest of blacks in achieving racial equality will be
accommodated only when it converges with the interests of
whites. "2

In the past year we have celebrated a number of civil rights
the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of
milestones:
3
Education; the fortieth anniversaries of the March on
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2 Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980).
' 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Washington and of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 4 Collectively our
nation now venerates our most progressive, socially transforming
legal edicts, even as we accept, or ignore, persistent racial
inequality. Much has been written about the limits and modern
meaning of Brown.5 Elsewhere I have argued that we have failed
to live up to the integrationist vision that animated Brown and
the civil rights movement, primarily because our neighborhoods
remain largely segregated by race and class.6 In this Article, I
celebrate the coalition politics that made the civil rights
revolution possible with a view toward understanding how and
why coalition politics of the progressive kind seem to be stymied
today. I argue that the thesis of interest convergence advanced
by Professor Derrick Bell, while pessimistic in its outlook, offers
a key insight into human nature and American race relations
4 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat.
241.
5 See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION

AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 6-7 (2004) (arguing, inter alia,
that the Supreme Court's declaration that separate facilities were inherently
unequal legitimated current unequal arrangements by suggesting that those who
remain poor and disempowered had simply failed to take advantage of their
definitially equal status); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS:
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 441-42, 467-68
(2004); CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE
FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 311 (2004) (arguing that
the unfulfilled legacy of Brown reflects our nation's limited commitment to racial
justice); MARK V. TUSHNET, BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION: THE BATTLE FOR
INTEGRATION 129-33 (1995) (arguing that Brown's principal effect was not to
integrate schools, but to motivate and strengthen the burgeoning civil rights
movement); Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v.
Board of Education and the Interest-Divergence Dilemma, 91 J. OF AM. HIST. 92,
95-96 (2004) (arguing that Brown "redefine[d] equality, not as a fair and just
distribution of resources, but as the absence of formal, legal barriers that separated
the races" and "convinced working-class whites that their interests lay in white
solidarity rather than collective cross-racial mobilization"); Gary Orfield &
Chungmei Lee, Brown at 50: King's Dream or Plessy's Nightmare? (Harvard
University/Civil Rights Project, Cambridge, M.A.), Jan. 2004, at 40 (arguing, inter
alia, that school segregation has been increasing since the 1990s and that a renewed
commitment to integration is needed, which would involve appointing Brownfriendly judges and civil rights enforcement officials, reviving federal aid programs
that confront race relations issues, and providing financial incentives to white
suburban schools that accept segregated minority students), available at
http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/resegO4/brown50.pdf;
Mark
Tushnet, Public Law Litigation and the Ambiguities of Brown, 61 FORDHAM L. REV.
23, 25, 27-28 (1992) (arguing that Brown's "all deliberate speed" standard, authored
by Justice Frankfurter in an attempt to limit the expansive reach of Brown,
ironically greatly expanded the Court's ability to impact social policy).
6 See generally SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW
RACE
AND CLASS ARE UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM (2004).
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that can and should be harnessed in order to build the
sustainable multiracial coalitions that will be necessary if we are
to close existing gaps of racial inequality. The civil rights
movement ultimately succeeded not only because it had moral
force, but also because a powerful, well-organized grassroots
effort altered the understanding of a voting majority in Congress
as to what was in their enlightened self-interest and in the
interest of the nation. I explore below the possibilities for
progressives to recapture majoritarian politics based upon a
convergence of interests among communities of color, working
class, and progressive whites. A key challenge, as Bell and
others suggest, is whether racial ideology often, but not
exclusively, harbored by whites can be transcended by engaging
7
seemingly disparate groups in the language of self-interest.
In Part I of this Article, I explore the coalition politics that
made it possible to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the
coalition theory that animated this movement. I then discuss
Bell's interest-convergence thesis and related arguments offered
by other scholars and social advocates who are skeptical about
the possibilities for mutual cooperation between blacks and other
groups, particularly whites. I argue that it is unsurprising that
any social group in power would oppose policies that they
perceive to be contrary to their self-interest, even in the face of
moral counterweights. Acknowledging this dark aspect of human
nature, I nevertheless conclude that broad coalitions for
progressive change are theoretically possible when common
interests, or a convergence of perceived self-interest, can be
established.
In Part II, I test this premise in the modern context,
examining the challenges to progressive coalition building
presented by our nation's new and increasing racial complexity.
I canvass recent political science literature regarding the theory
and practice of multiracial coalition building, exploring how
inter-group relational dynamics have changed since the civil
rights movement. I see both promise and peril in demographic
' Professor Bell might use "racism" where I use "racial ideology." See DERRICK
BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 13, 198-99
(1992). By "racial ideology," I mean any type of commitment or belief of a racial
nature, conscious or unconscious, that might inhibit someone from joining a coalition
that otherwise is advancing public policies that are in that person's rational selfinterest. See discussion infra Part II.A.2 for a more detailed analysis.
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trends. With rising diversity, it is increasingly unlikely that a
single racial group can succeed independently in pursuing a
progressive policy agenda. In racially diverse contexts, coalition
building is the only route to meaningful political power.
Diversity, then, can be a source of power if properly harnessed.
The risk with ever-complex diversity, however, is that the
transaction costs of inter-group negotiations and the possibility
for conflict rise with each new group or interest that must be
incorporated. There is an especially heightened risk that racial
and ethnic minorities will perceive their relative interests in
zero-sum terms.
More importantly, the chief obstacle to
multiracial coalition building appears to be the persistence of
negative racial stereotypes, especially those held about African
Americans. I offer hopeful examples of successful multiracial
coalitions that have transcended potential race and class conflicts
and, therefore, altered the status quo in a policymaking context.
Building off these examples, I argue that the best route to
creating a more enlightened understanding of how the interests
of seemingly strange bedfellows do converge is through
leadership and grassroots organization fueled by the artful
dissemination of empirical data. This is labor-intensive and
challenging, but necessary, work.
While the path of least
resistance is to work solely within single issue or single identity
constituencies, progressives will be increasingly disempowered
without alliances and relationships across boundaries of race and
class.
I. THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND INTEREST GROUP
CONVERGENCE

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 became law on July 2 of that
year, after fifty-seven days of debate.8 Among the other iconic
events of that hot summer were the murders of civil rights
workers Schwerner, Goodman, and Chaney in Mississippi, and
the Birmingham church bombing that killed four little girls. 9 A
8 See Linda Parker, Civil Rights Act of 1964 Remains a Lofty Pursuit Still in
Progress, DETROIT NEWS, July 29, 2004, at A17; They Did Go On, WASH. POST, Jan.

16, 2005, at B4.

' See Laura Parker, Digging Up a State's Dark Past: MississippiReporter's Work
Leads to New Charges in 1964 Killings of Rights Workers, U.S.A. TODAY, Jan. 17,
2005, at A4; Margaret M. Russell, CleansingMoments and Retrospective Justice, 101
MICH. L. REV. 1225, 1240-41 (2003).
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young Colin Powell, then an infantry captain undergoing
leadership training at Fort Benning, Georgia, made it plain to his
white colleagues why he was so disappointed with Senator Barry
Goldwater's stand against the Act and what the new law would
mean in Powell's own life. Goldwater was one of only a few
Republican Senators to vote against the Act, and he made his
opposition to civil rights the centerpiece of his failed presidential
bid against Lyndon Johnson in the same year. Powell noted that
being black meant "you'd better have a strong bladder,"' 0 because
during a drive between Washington, D.C. and Fort Benning, he
and his family were hard pressed to find a decent place to use a
restroom, to dine, or to spend the night. The mantra of property
rights asserted by his fellow white officers in defense of
Goldwater's position paled, he argued, to the indignities being
suffered by black folks."
Powell's story of frustration with
interstate travel is a testament to the very different
America that
2
prevailed in the era of Jim Crow segregation.'
A.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Its Legacy

Among its many provisions, the Civil Rights Act of 1964
barred racial discrimination in public accommodations,
employment, and virtually all federally funded activitiesincluding education-and
also prohibited
discriminatory
activities based on other characteristics such as gender, religion,
and national origin.'3 Women's equality was introduced by fiat.
'o See Clarence Page, 40 Years of Opportunities,CHI. TRIB., July 4, 2004, at C9.
" See id. (citing COLIN POWELL, MY AMERICAN JOURNEY (1995)).
12 According to Kenneth Teasdale, Counsel to Majority Leader Mansfield

at the
time of passage of the Act, one of the reasons President Lyndon B. Johnson was
sympathetic to the civil rights cause was that on his trips between Washington, D.C.
and his home in Texas, there was only one hotel, located in Atlanta, Georgia, where
Johnson and his black driver could both get a room. Kenneth Teasdale, Remarks at
a Panel Discussion following the Childress Memorial Lecture at St. Louis University
School of Law (Oct. 1, 2004).
13 Title II of the Act bars discrimination in public accommodations, including
hotels and restaurants. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 201, 78 Stat.
241, 243 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000)). Title VI prohibited
recipients of federal funds from engaging in discrimination and authorized the
federal government to withhold federal funds from any program that practiced
discrimination. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat. 241, 252
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000)). Title VII prohibited
discrimination in employment by any business employing more than twenty-five
people and established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) to
review complaints. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-16, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as
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The Act's ban on "sex" discrimination in employment was
actually added by a southern Democrat in the House of
Representatives in an attempt to derail the bill.1 4 Since its initial
passage, the Act has been amended periodically in ways that
strengthen its reach and enforcement mechanisms, rendering it
our nation's most comprehensive civil rights legislation. 5 The
Act also became the model for other comprehensive antidiscrimination legislation, such as the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act 16 and the Americans with Disabilities Act.17
Title II of the Civil Rights Act, which bans discrimination in
public accommodations, has reaped the most obvious social

amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-2 (2000)).
14 David B. Filvaroff & Raymond E. Wolfinger, The Origin and Enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, in LEGACIES OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 9, 21-22
(Bernard Grofman ed., 2000).
"5 For example, amendments to Title VII enacted in 1972 gave the EEOC the
authority to sue private employers and made federal, state, and local government, as
well as educational institutions, subject to the ban on employment discrimination.
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000)). Amendments enacted in 1991
expanded Title VII to include congressional and high level political employees. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2004). In 1976, Congress greatly facilitated the enforcement of the
Act by providing for attorney's fees for private litigants. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000)). In 1987, Congress, reacting to recent Supreme Court
decisions, reaffirmed the broad scope of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and specifically
forbade institutions receiving federal monies from discriminating on the basis of
race, color, national origin, religion, sex, disability, or age in programs or activities
that did not directly benefit from the assistance. Civil Rights Restoration Act of
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 16871688 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4a (2000)). The Civil Rights Act of 1991 overruled
several Supreme Court decisions adopted in the 1980s that weakened the scope of
previous civil rights statutes, and it provided for the recovery of fees and costs for
lawsuits in which the plaintiff prevailed, for jury trials, and for the recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages in intentional employment discrimination
cases. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000)).
16 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act protects workers over forty years
old from employment discrimination based on age, prohibiting such discrimination
with respect to any term, condition, or privilege of employment. Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000)).
17 The Americans with Disabilities Act prohibits employment discrimination
against a qualified individual with a disability, and prohibits such discrimination in
state and local government services, public accommodations, transportation, and
telecommunications. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336,
104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. §§
12101-12213).
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benefits.
Today, incidents of denial of access to public
accommodations based upon race or other immutable
characteristics are rare and typically met with widespread social
disapprobation.' 8 The Act and its progeny have also had an
impact in improving the lives and opportunities of many, most
notably African Americans. According to the Census Bureau,
since 1964, the percentage of blacks who are twenty-five and
older and who obtain at least a high school diploma has risen
from 26% to 80%.9 The black poverty rate has declined from
approximately 42% to approximately 24%,20 and yet serious gaps
of racial inequality persist. For example, the black poverty rate
is three times higher than that of non-Hispanic whites, only 8%
of whom are poor.2' Black median wealth is about 16% that of
whites and black median household income is about 64% that of
whites-$29,500 compared to $46,300, respectively.22 There are
also pronounced differences between blacks and non-Hispanic
whites, inter alia, in employment, educational attainment, and
rates of imprisonment, 23 differences that may be tied to stark
"s For example, when restaurant chain Denny's was accused of racial
discrimination against thousands of black customers in many of its restaurants,
condemnation was so widespread that the chain was forced to allow its franchisees
to retool menus appealing to minorities, launch an ad campaign to repair its public
image, and reach an agreement with the NAACP to increase the number of blacks in
management positions and the number of minority-owned franchises. Calvin Sims,
Giving Denny's a Menu for Change, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1994, § 1, at 43.
'9 Press Release, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Facts for Features, Special Edition,
Civil Rights Act of 1964: 40th Anniversary (June 30, 2004), available at
http://www.census.gov/ Press-Release/www/2004/cb04-ffseO9-01.pdf.
20 Id.

21 BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR

POVERTY

IN

THE

UNITED

& JOSEPH DALAKER,

STATES:

2002,

at

2

U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
(2003),

available

at

http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/p60-222.pdf (issued Sept. 2003).
22 CASHIN, supra note 6, at xii (citing Ana M. Aizcorbe et al., Recent Changes in
U.S. Family Finances: Evidence from the 1998 and 2001 Survey of Consumer
Finances, FED. RESERVE BULL., Jan. 2003, at 7 tbl.3, 8 (showing black median net
worth at $19,000 in 2001 compared to $120,990 for whites), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/ 2003/0103lead.pdf).
21 Since the 1970s, the black unemployment rate has generally been double that
of whites, and during economic downturns the unemployment gap increases, that is
to say, blacks feel the effects of recessions more acutely than whites. U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, REPORT ON THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE 191 (2001), available at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/rtaw/pdf/rtaw2001.pdf. Although blacks and whites aged
twenty-five through twenty-nine are close to parity in completion of a high school
education (in 2000, 88% of black men and 86% of black women aged twenty-five
through twenty-nine completed high school compared with 93% of white men and
95% of white women), blacks aged twenty-five through twenty-nine complete college
educations at a rate much lower than whites (in 2000, 18% of black men and 17% of
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wealth and class disparities between blacks and whites.2 4 The
persistence of racial inequality underscores, in my view, the need
to rethink how progressivism can return to the center of
American politics. To that end, I turn now to explore how
coalition politics made enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
possible.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and CoalitionPolitics
Passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was by no means
inevitable. In the near century between Reconstruction and the
civil rights movement, there were some attempts to confer equal
rights on black Americans through legislation, but, as of 1964,
In the ten years
none had succeeded in any meaningful way.
B.

black women aged twenty-five through twenty-nine completed a college education,
compared with 32% of white men and 36% of white women). See generally U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE A-2: PERCENT OF PEOPLE 25 YEARS AND OVER WHO HAVE
COMPLETED HIGH SCHOOL OR COLLEGE, BY RACE, HISPANIC ORIGIN AND SEX:
SELECTED YEARS 1940 TO 2003 (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/

population/socdemo/education/tabA-2.pdf. In fact, young black males are more likely
to end up in the criminal justice system than in institutions of higher learning.
There are more black men in prison and jails than enrolled in colleges and
universities, a dramatic and sharp reversal since 1980, when black men enrolled in
higher education institutions outnumbered black men behind bars by three to one.
The effects of the penal system are harshest in the ghetto, where a majority of black
men can be under criminal supervision. CASHIN, supranote 6, at 229-30, 247.
24 Among whites, the raw number of people that populate the lowest economic
strata are smallest. These numbers grow larger with each rise up the income scale.
With blacks, the opposite is true, with more black people populating the lowest
economic strata and the raw numbers of blacks declining with each rise up the
income scale. In other words, whites as a group are more likely to be middle and
upper class and blacks as a group are more likely to be among the lower economic
classes. See PROCTOR & DALAKER, supra note 21, at 2; see also Harry T. Edwards,
The Journey from Brown v. Board of Education to Grutter v. Bollinger: From Racial
Assimilation to Diversity, 102 MICH. L. REV. 944, 969 n.105 (2004). Poor blacks, in
turn, are much more likely than poor whites to live in hyper-segregated, high
poverty neighborhoods, with their attendant weak schools, violence and limited
economic opportunity, while poor whites are more likely to live in middle class
settings that afford more opportunity for upward mobility. See CASHIN, supra note 6,
at 7-11. One researcher has found that high school graduation and college
attendance rates are equal for blacks and whites when one controls for wealth rather
than income. See DALTON CONLEY, BEING BLACK, LIVING IN THE RED: RACE,
WEALTH, AND SOCIAL POLICY IN AMERICA 68-79 (1999).

25 The Civil Rights Act of 1866, the work of radical Republicans of the
Reconstruction Era, passed by one vote over President Andrew Johnson's veto-the
first veto override in American history. It granted full citizenship to all persons born
on American soil-except Native Americans who were exempt from taxation-and
provided that all such citizens were guaranteed the rights to make and enforce
contracts; sue and be sued; give evidence in court; and inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
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between the Supreme Court's announcement of the Brown
decision-declaring "separate but equal" racial segregation to be
inconsistent with constitutional principles 26-and the passage of
the Act, virtually no progress was made in school desegregation.2 7
It was only when democratic processes demanded social change,
resulting in new enforcement provisions in Title VI of the Act for
school desegregation, that some change was forthcoming. The
Supreme Court's decision in 1968 in Greene v. County School
Board,28 which finally announced that immediate school
desegregation was the imperative consequence of the Court's
decision in Brown,2 9 likely reflected this new democratic
consensus.
This transformatibn in majoritarian democratic opinion
would not have happened through mere reliance on the
leadership of political elites. Prior to the civil rights movement,
most American presidents had been reluctant to advocate civil
hold, and convey real and personal property. Civil Rights Act of 1866, available at
http://www.USConstitution.com/civilrightsactof1866pict.htm (last visited Apr. 2,
2005). However, most of these provisions were rendered ineffective either by the Ku
Klux Klan's reign of terror or the Supreme Court's limitation of Congress's
Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power only to eliminating slavery. See
generally Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 23-25 (1883). It was not until 1968, after
the civil rights revolution, that the Court finally deemed it appropriate for Congress
to confer these citizenship rights on freed slaves under its Thirteenth Amendment
enforcement powers, as a means of removing the "badges and incidents of slavery."
See e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 197-99 (1989); Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170, 179 (1976); Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 105
(1971); Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 413, 439 (1968). The Civil Rights Act of 1875, a
final effort by the radical Republicans on behalf of emancipated blacks, prohibited
discrimination in hotels and other lodgings, public transportation, and places of
public accommodation. The Supreme Court, in the infamous Civil Rights Cases,
struck down the Act as unconstitutional, stating that Congress had no authority
under the Fourteenth Amendment to regulate discrimination by private individuals.
These cases essentially put to rest for three-quarters of a century any effort by
Congress to address civil rights. JAMES M. MCPHERSON, THE ABOLITIONIST LEGACY:
FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO THE NAACP 16-23 (1975). In 1957 and 1960, Congress
again attempted civil rights legislation, both times resulting in southern Democrats
weakening the bills beyond any effectiveness. See infra note 30.
26 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
27 Cass R. Sunstein, Did Brown Matter?, THE NEW YORKER, May 3, 2004, at
102-03 (noting that 98% of black students in the South still attended racially
segregated schools as of 1964). The Brown II decision of 1955, in which the Supreme
Court announced that desegregation should occur "with all deliberate speed," is
credited with contributing to this considerable lag in progress in school
desegregation. See, e.g., OGLETREE, supra note 5, at xiii.
2' 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
29 See id. at 439.
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rights legislation because doing so required them to oppose well
organized southern Democrats whom they needed to advance
other agenda items. 30 Before the 1964 Act, the most notable civil
30 See Robert D. Loevy, Introduction: The Background and Setting of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW
THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION 1, 13 (Robert D. Loevy ed.,1997). President

Roosevelt acted on civil rights only through taking executive actions that did not
require congressional approval, establishing a Civil Rights Section in the Justice
Department and, under threat of a massive black march on Washington, creating a
Fair Employment Practices Committee to eliminate discrimination in defense
plants. Although the Committee was abolished by Congress five years later,
Roosevelt's capitulation taught black leaders that social movement pressure could
yield policy gains. Id. at 13-14.
Truman continued the precedent of using executive powers rather than
legislation to advance civil rights when he ordered the integration of the United
States Armed Forces. Before he issued his executive order to integrate the Armed
Forces, Truman had tried integration through legislation. The attempt failed, and
Truman's relationship with the southern Democrats in Congress was ruined forever
afterwards. Id. at 15, 25. He also appointed a Committee of Civil Rights, which
published a controversial report detailing the civil rights violations blacks faced in
the South. Id. at 15.
Eisenhower's administration was initially more reluctant than either Roosevelt
or Truman to address civil rights issues through legislation, relying on executive
action in the first three years of Eisenhower's term in office. Eisenhower ended
segregationist practices in the District of Columbia and in the federal government
bureaucracy, and gave his attorney general broad leeway in pursuing civil rights
issues, including allowing him to argue for the abolition of school segregation in
Brown v. Board of Education. Id. at 16, 25. Eisenhower's contributions to civil rights
were motivated partly by the emerging civil rights movement. With the national
press coverage of the Montgomery bus boycott and the rise of Martin Luther King,
Jr., the American public was becoming more conscious of the condition of blacks in
the South. Northern politicians, who had hoped that civil rights could be dealt with
quietly and slowly, saw their hopes disappear with every news broadcast of white
southerners beating peaceful demonstrators. Andrew Young, Roundtable of
Participantsin the Passageof the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in THIS CONSTITUTION 29,
31-32 (Raymond E. Wolfinger ed., 1991).
The decision in Brown forced Eisenhower to directly confront southern
antipathy toward integration. When states refused to integrate their schools, he
reluctantly sent in U.S. marshals to enforce the Supreme Court's orders. See
Filvaroff & Wolfinger, supra note 14, at 10. This action cost Eisenhower a
tremendous amount of support in both the South and in Congress. By the beginning
of Eisenhower's second term, civil rights issues could no longer be confined to
executive action. Black leaders' demands that the government take a more active
role in ending discrimination were beginning to resonate with more and more
Americans, especially as the national news covered the violent assaults suffered by
activists in the South. In 1956, Eisenhower reluctantly allowed Attorney General
Brownell to present a civil rights bill to Congress. See JAMES L. SUNDQUIST,
POLITICS AND POLICY: THE EISENHOWER, KENNEDY, AND JOHNSON YEARS 229-30
(1968). Eventually called the Civil Rights Act of 1957, it provided for the creation of
a Commission on Civil Rights that would study racial discrimination and
recommend remedies, the expansion of the civil rights section of the Justice
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rights advances-President Roosevelt's order of fair employment
practices in the defense industry and President Truman's order
to desegregate the armed services-had resulted from executive
orders that were issued only after the venerable A. Philip
Randolph, founder of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters,
threatened to lead mass protests in Washington.3 In early 1963,
neither John F. Kennedy nor Lyndon B. Johnson was an ardent
advocate for civil rights legislation. President Kennedy was
extremely reluctant to press for such legislation, fearing that his
party would split over the issue and destroy his agenda.32
The Act came about as a result of a grassroots mobilization
that demanded momentous social change from political elites. In
particular, the extensive organization and training of citizens
and students in nonviolent mass protest were critical in creating
what ultimately seemed like spontaneous eruptions of civil
disobedience across the South.3 3 The turning point came in the
spring of 1963 with the Birmingham demonstrations led by Dr.
Martin Luther King.
King was aware that the police
Department, the ability of the attorney general to secure court injunctions in civil
rights cases and remove them from state courts to federal courts, and an increase in

the Justice Department's power to prosecute interferences with the right to vote. Id.
at 226.
The Civil Rights Act of 1957 was doomed from the start. Eisenhower did not
even endorse the entire bill until late in 1956, when his reelection was assured. See
Loevy, supra, at 27. More importantly, the southern Democrats in Congress
immediately organized to kill the bill's most meaningful enforcement mechanisms.
Framing the issue as one of states' rights, the southern Democrats raised enough
furor to scare Eisenhower into revoking his support for parts of the bill. Satisfied
that the bill was thus effectively toothless, the southern Democrats allowed the bill
to pass without filibuster. Id. at 30. A similarly weak Civil Rights Act of 1960
became law only after a filibuster by southern Democrats in the senate that
rendered this bill equally toothless. Id. at 36-37.
31 See TIME ON

Two CROSSES:

THE COLLECTED WRITINGS OF BAYARD RUSTIN, at

xv (Devon W. Carbado & Donald Weise eds., 2003) (citing such advances as
occurring only after Randolph's threat of mass protest).
32 Kennedy became president in an atmosphere highly charged with racial
politics; the 1960 presidential campaign had seen both parties insert civil rights
planks into their platforms. Kennedy himself had promised extensive legislative civil
rights reforms and personally called Martin Luther King, Jr. while the civil rights
leader was in jail. Once he took office, however, he quickly backpedaled from his
promises and reverted to the precedent of action only through executive orders.
Federal agencies were ordered to eliminate racial discrimination in their
departments, the Justice Department increased its civil rights litigation, and federal
aid for construction of segregated housing was eliminated. In 1962, he offered weak
support for a bill that would eliminate literacy tests, but the bill quickly failed. See
Filvaroff & Wolfinger, supra note 14, at 10-11.
33 See infra note 38.
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commissioner, Eugene "Bull" Connor, was a notorious racist who
was prone to violence, and there is evidence that King intended
to provoke him. King had always believed that the civil rights
movement would be most influential when the American people
saw peaceful demonstrators contrasted against violent white
attackers.3 4 To that end, his organization held conferences with
the press to discuss the demonstration and to ensure that the
cameras would be rolling, and schoolchildren were recruited to
march in the demonstration with the adults.3 5
Connor, as
expected, responded violently, turning fire hoses and attack dogs
on the demonstrators.3 6 The images of schoolchildren blasted
with water and chased by dogs caused a tremendous uproar
throughout the country and sent Birmingham into chaos.
Numerous organizations, including labor unions, churches, and
civic groups, joined hands with the civil rights movement in
demanding government action against discrimination. White
racists began bombing King's motel room, prompting angry black
youths to counter with street violence against whites.3 7 Most
importantly, the Birmingham demonstrations inspired almost
one thousand similar non-violent protests in over one hundred
southern cities, which resulted in over twenty thousand arrests.3 8
3' Filvaroff & Wolfinger, supra note 14, at 11.
3- Id. at 11-12.
36

Id.

37 Id. at 12. Two years later, "Bloody Sunday," when civil rights protesters were

met with violent beatings on the Edmund Pettus bridge in Selma, Alabama while
news cameras rolled, would provide a similar impetus for the passage of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. See JOHN LEWIS & MICHAEL D'ORSO, WALKING WITH THE WIND:
A MEMOIR OF THE MOVEMENT 344, 353, 360-61 (1998).

While this chorus of a thousand similar protests may have seemed
spontaneous, they were the result of years of grassroots organizing. The successes of
the Montgomery Bus Boycott of 1955 prompted the formation of the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in 1957. Formed with the express goal of
stimulating mass direct action against racial oppression, SCLC united black
southern ministers who had all been involved in similar local protest movements in
southern communities. Several training institutions, like the Highlander Folk
School, were established specifically to cultivate local civil rights leadership across
the South that would be skilled in the tactics of nonviolent social protest. The
movement was founded on the persistent building of local institutions that could
undertake similar training of citizens everywhere. Not surprisingly, the major
cultural events of the civil rights movement-the Montgomery Bus Boycott, the
Freedom Rides, Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee's (SNCC) "Freedom
Summer" in Mississippi, and the Birmingham protests-all flowed from this
extensive, intentional grassroots organization. See PAUL OSTERMAN, GATHERING
38

POWER: THE FUTURE OF PROGRESSIVE POLITICS IN AMERICA 18-20, 53-54 (2002);
TIME ON TWO CROSSES, supra note 31, at xxiv.
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The Kennedy administration became terrified at the prospect
of racial violence exploding across the country. For the first time,
the policy makers in the White House came to believe that
ignoring civil rights issues would be more politically disastrous
than alienating the southern Democrats in Congress. Inaction on
the issue would not only lead to more demonstrations and
violence, but it would also allow the Republicans to take the lead
on civil rights and carry it straight through the presidential
election the next year. Kennedy thus appeared on national
television in June 1963 and told the public that he would send
strong proposals to Congress to eliminate segregation in public
accommodations.3 9 The Justice Department began drafting a bill,
trying to strike a balance between a bill too strong to pass and a
bill too weak to be worth passing.
The March on Washington, which occurred on August 28,
1963, added tremendous momentum to the legislative effort. A.
Philip Randolph first conceived of such a mass protest in 1941.
Randolph had been planning a mass demonstration against black
unemployment in conjunction with the one hundred year
anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation. This effort was
quickly married to the effort to build support for the civil rights
bill wending its way through Congress. Randolph (representing
the Negro American Labor Council); King (representing the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC)); and the
leaders of the NAACP, Urban League, Congress of Racial
Equality (CORE), and Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee (SNCC) formed a coalition to organize a national
march in an effort to build on the spontaneous demonstrations
occurring nationwide and to bring in as many allies as possible to
the civil rights cause, especially trade unions and church groups.
Bayard Rustin, the early architect of nonviolent social protest
that animated the movement and a strong adherent of coalition
40
When
politics, was named the chief organizer of the march.
the
on
descended
demonstrators
peaceful
250,000
more than
constituted
white-it
were
national Mall-one quarter of whom
the largest mass demonstration in the nation's history, receiving
more national and international press coverage than any prior
39 OSTERMAN, supra note 38, at 13.
40 See Beginnings are More Than Endings, MANAS J., Oct. 27, 1965, at 2,
9
65/XVIII"
available at http://www.manasjournal.org/pdf-library/VolumeXVIII1
43.pdf.
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social protest.4
President Kennedy, who had tried to get
organizers to cancel the march, ultimately endorsed it publicly.4 2
Republican support was absolutely necessary if a civil rights
bill was going to be passed in the face of staunch opposition from
southern Democrats. The Kennedy administration engaged in
intense negotiations with House Republicans, convincing them
that it was in their political interest to support civil rights, and
allowed Republicans to take credit for several provisions of the
bill.4 3 The end result was that the bill passed the House with
stronger support than it had when the bill was originally
proposed.44 The bill entered the Senate several months after
Kennedy's assassination. President Johnson announced shortly
after taking office that his first priority was the enactment of the
civil rights bill as passed in the House. Johnson had already
passed major points of his agenda by the time the bill reached
the Senate, so he had little to fear from southern Democrat
reprisals. In addition, as a southern Democrat himself, he was
determined not to appear weak on civil rights and jeopardize
black support for the Democratic Party.4 5
In the Senate,
southern Democrats initiated a filibuster which continued until
the Johnson administration marshaled enough votes for cloture
by co-opting Republicans who represented districts with small
black populations and no racial conflict.4 6 The bill ultimately
passed in the Senate by a lopsided vote of 73-27, with few
alterations.4 7
In the ensuing presidential election, Johnson won by a
landslide with a coalition of northern liberals and blacks,
establishing the base of the Democratic party for the next forty
years.
Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater, who had
vociferously opposed both the cloture vote and the Act itself,
41 See Abbeville Press, The Civil Rights Movement-The
March on Washington,
1963: "We
Stood on a
Height," at http://www.abbeville.com/civilrights/
washington.asp.
42 This ever so brief summary of the coalition politics
that animated the passage
of the Act does not begin to do justice to the civil rights movement and the
courageous acts of thousands. For a prize-winning treatment of the subject, see

TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1954-1963

(1988).

43 See Filvaroff & Wolfinger, supra note
14, at 14-26.
4

Id. at 14-15, 21-22.

46

Id. at 23-26.

41 Id. at 24.
47 Id. at 26.
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48
carried only the Deep South and a few other states. The efforts
of moderate Republicans to give their party a pro-civil rights
slant, which was the reason many of them supported the Act's
passage, were quickly washed away with Goldwater's states'
rights rhetoric.4 9 Arch-conservatives, faced with resounding
defeat in the presidential election, did more than lick their
They set about building the foundations for a
wounds.
conservative ideological movement in which ideas that were then
out of the mainstream of even their own party would ultimately
take center stage. It took less than twenty years for a revitalized
conservative movement to bear fruit in the election of Ronald
Reagan in 1980, and movement conservatism continues to be
vital to this day.5" Meanwhile, the coalition of working class and
ethnic whites, liberals, and blacks that made the New Deal
possible has eroded."
Nevertheless, the civil rights revolution and the legislation it
5 2 Many of the
gave birth to spawned other social movements.
rights movements that followed the Act's passage, especially the
feminist movement, were rooted in frustration with the Act's
shortcomings.5 3 Emulating the work of women's organizations,

HistoryCentral.com,

Presidential Election 1964, States Carried, at
http://www.multied.com/elections/1964state.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
41 See Filvaroff & Wolfinger, supranote 14, at 30.
50By 2003, after the midterm elections, Democrats were both out of the White
House and in the minority in both houses of Congress for the first time in fifty
years-a minority position that appeared even more established after the 2004
presidential election in which George W. Bush garnered 51% of the vote. See
CNN.com, Election 2004-U.S. President, at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/
pages/results/president/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
" See Alexander Polikoff, RacialInequality and the Black Ghetto, 13 POVERTY &
RACE (Poverty & Race Research Action Council, Washington D.C.) Nov.-Dec. 2004,
at 1 (arguing the demise of the New Deal coalition since November 1968), available
at http://www.prrac.org/news.php (lastvisited Apr. 2, 2005).
52 Of course, the movement also led to the passage of the Voting Rights Act of
1965 and the Fair Housing Act of 1968.
53 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, charged with enforcing the
Act's prohibition against sex discrimination, largely ignored the 50,000 sex
discrimination complaints that poured in within the first five years of its existence.
Angered by this sexism, but emboldened by the fact that civil rights legislation was
passing through Congress at all, women began organizing to pass legislation
targeted toward sex discrimination. The National Organization for Women was
founded in 1966 for just such a purpose, paving the way for a surge of women's
rights organizations dedicated to legislative change. The passage of Title IX and the
introduction of the Equal Rights Amendment, along with many other federal, state,
and local sex discrimination laws, originated from the feminist movement's
emulation of the civil rights movement's focus on legislation to overcome
48
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Latino, Asian, and gay and lesbian groups have also sought to
strengthen provisions of the Act or to introduce new legislation to
address specific group concerns. Indeed, the idea of interestgroup organizing to achieve legislative goals, which is now a
main conduit through which the citizenry interacts with
government, is a legacy of the civil rights movement's success
with the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
C.

Coalition Theory and Interest-Convergence
While blacks were the leaders and main participants in the
civil rights movement, allies were welcomed. In particular, the
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), founded in
April 1960 in alliance with SCLC, began the interracial brigades
of non-violent civil rights workers that organized Freedom
Summer and the Freedom Rides. 4 After a first wave of civil
rights victories and an emerging "black power" movement, an
explicit intellectual debate ensued about the efficacy of
interracial coalitions. The debate turned on whether blacks-a
marginal,
historically
oppressed
group-and
whites-a
dominant, historic oppressor-could realistically work together in
a way that would truly benefit black people. 5
Bayard Rustin, an African American who had worked in
pacifist and labor movements before turning to civil rights, often
argued that political participation on the part of a range of
interest and identity groups is necessary to any project of social
reform. 6 The New York Times recently quoted Rustin, saying,
"'The issue is which coalition to join and how to make it
responsive to your program.
Necessarily there will be
compromise.
But the difference between expediency and
morality in politics is the difference between selling out a
principle and making smaller concessions to win larger ones."'57
discrimination.

BONNIE EISENBERG & MARY RUTHSDOTTER, THE NATIONAL
WOMEN'S HISTORY PROJECT, LIVING THE LEGACY: THE WOMEN'S RIGHTS MOVEMENT

1848-1998 (1998), at http://www.legacy98.org/move-hist.html (last visited Apr. 2,
2005).
'
See TIME ON Two CROSSES, supra note 31, at xxvii.
55The debate necessarily was mainly about "blacks" and "whites" because, at
the time, the nation was 87% white, 10% black and only 3% "other." See infra note
88 and accompanying text.
56 See Michael Anderson, The Organizer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, § 7 (Book
Review), at 13.
" Id. (quoting BAYARD RUSTIN, From Protest to Politics: The Future of the Civil
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Rustin was quite explicit that his ambitions for the civil rights
movement went beyond mere desegregation to the realm of
economic justice. Establishing "the Negro's right to sit at a
Woolworth's counter" or to vote were relatively easy goals, "but it
demands much creativity, patience, and political stamina to plan,
develop, and implement programs and priorities. It is one thing
to organize sentiment behind laws that do not disturb consensus
politics, and quite another to win battles for the redistribution of
wealth."58 Rustin argued that true racial equality would require
a redistribution of resources in the form of an aggressive program
of federal spending. He supported A. Philip Randolph's proposed
$100 billion Freedom Budget, an effort on the order of the
Marshall Plan, because, he argued, only $20 billion or more in
annual spending would "destroy the economic and social
5 9 Such an
consequences of racism and poverty at home today."
audacious agenda necessitated coalition politics that expanded
beyond the mere 10% of the population that blacks then
constituted. Then, as now, meaningful reform required altering
current political consensus, and therefore, he argued, "[wie must
see to it that the liberal-labor-civil rights coalition is maintained
,,60 For this reason, Rustin
and, indeed, strengthened.
publicly rejected the emerging rhetoric of "black power," and its
underlying skepticism about the viability of coalition politics. He
also seemed to recognize the centrality of self-interest in
American politics. He advocated a broader agenda tha. spoke to
the needs of all poor and working class people. "[A] liberal-laborcivil rights coalition," he argued, "would work to make the
Democratic party truly responsive to the aspirations of the
poor,... which would develop support for programs.., aimed at
the reconstruction of American society in the interests of greater
power" were
social justice. 61 In his view, the advocates of "black,,6
'
establishment.
black
new
"a
merely aiming to create
Stokely Carmichael and Charles Hamilton answered Rustin
in their book Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in
Rights Movement, in TIME ON TWO CROSSES, supra note 31, at 126).
58 Bayard Rustin, "Black Power" and Coalition Politics, COMMENT., September
1966, at 35, 40 (emphasis added).
59 Id.; see also id. at 36 (advocating the Freedom Budget).
60 Id. at 40; see also id. at 36 ("[O]ne-tenth of the population cannot accomplish
much by itself ... .
61

Id. at 36.

62

Id.
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America.6 3 In a chapter entitled "The Myths of Coalition," they
attacked the notion that political coalition participants and the
civil rights gains they wrought were motivated by anything other
than raw self-interest.6 Perceiving the interests of whites and
blacks to be often adverse, they argued that the so-called "allies"
of black people would prove unreliable when a conflict of interest
arises. 65 With this clear-eyed understanding, they articulated
their view as to when coalitions between blacks and whites could
be viable, even as they approached the subject with much
skepticism:
We... recognize the potential for limited, short-term coalitions
on relatively minor issues. But we must note that such
approaches seldom come to terms with the roots of institutional
racism. In fact, one might well argue that such coalitions on
subordinate issues are, in the long run, harmful. They could
lead whites and blacks into thinking either that their long-term
interests do not conflict when in fact they do, or that such lesser
issues are the only issues which can be solved. With these
limitations in mind, and a spirit of caution, black people can
approach possibilities of coalition for specific goals.
Viable coalitions therefore stem from four preconditions: (a)
the recognition by the parties involved of their respective selfinterests; (b) the mutual belief that each party stands to benefit
in terms of that self-interest from allying with the other or
others; (c) the acceptance of the fact that each party has its own
independent base of power and does not depend for ultimate
decision-making on a force outside itself; and (d) the realization
that the coalition deals with specific and identifiable-as
66
opposed to general and vague-goals.
These early thinkers, even on opposite sides of a debate,
clearly viewed self-interest as a central force in American
63 CARMICHAEL & HAMILTON, supra note 1.
64 See id. at 58-84.
65 See id. at 75-76. Stokely Carmichael changed

his name to Kwame Ture after
publication of BLACK POWER. In this essay, when I refer to him as the author of that
text, I use the name Stokely Carmichael.
6 Id. at 79-80. This early articulation of the preconditions for interracial
coalition building has been influential and tested in recent political science
literature concerning the efficacy of such coalitions. See, e.g., Paula D. McClain &
Steven C. Tauber, Racial Minority Group Relations in a Multiracial Society, in
GOVERNING

AMERICAN

CITIES:

INTERETHNIC

COALITIONS,

COMPETITION,

CONFLICT 111,

AND

113 (Michael Jones-Correa ed., 2001); Raphael J. Sonenshein,
Biracial Coalitions in Big Cities: Why They Succeed, Why They Fail, in RACIAL
POLITICS IN AMERICAN CITIES 193, 199 (Rufus P. Browning et al. eds., 1990).
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politics. More recently, Derrick Bell argued explicitly that
measures intended to advance racial equality only occur when
such measures converge with the interests of the dominant,
white majority. He states:
Throughout the history of civil rights policies, even the most
serious injustices suffered by blacks, including slavery,
segregation, and patterns of murderous violence, have been
insufficient, standing alone, to gain real relief from any branch
of government. Rather, relief from racial discrimination has
come only when policymakers recognize that such relief will
provide a clear benefit for the nation or portions of the populace
... [T]he most significant political advances for blacks resulted
from policies which were intended to serve, and had the effect of
serving, the interests and convenience of67 whites rather than
remedying racial injustices against blacks.
In support of this " interest-convergence" theory, Bell argues
that the abolition of slavery in northern states was animated by
the "North's relatively small investment in slaves combined with
the great hostility of the white laboring class to the competition
of slaves; the fear of slave revolts; and a general belief that there
The
was no place for 'inferior' blacks in the new societies.
those
"in
only
slaves
freed
which
Proclamation,
Emancipation
areas in which the whites . had not rejected the Confederacy,"
was issued to serve "the best interests of the country," the
ultimate end to slavery being only "a fortuitous dividend of a
69 The Civil War Amendments
policy adopted for other reasons.,
reflected primarily "the desire to maintain Republican control of
Congress and frustrate southerners from reasserting the political
70
power they had wielded prior to the war., Also, Bell argues, the
Supreme Court decided Brown as it did because it concurred with
the State Department that invalidating school segregation would
advance the fight against communism abroad: "a fortuitous
symmetry... between what blacks sought and what the nation

BELL, supra note 5, at 49, 56. Bell first articulated his enormously influential
interest-convergence theory in a Harvard Law Review article published in 1980. See
Bell, supra note 2, at 522-28.
68 BELL, supra note 5, at 50.
69 Id. at 54.
67

70 Id. at 57.
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needed."'" Interestingly, Bell gives no direct treatment to the
civil rights movement in support of his interest-convergence
theory.
In fact, he barely mentions it in his book Silent
Covenants,7 2 perhaps because his primary focus was assessing
the modern implications of Brown, which he views as "the
definitive example of interest-convergence as a motivation for
racial policy-making. 7 3
The flip side to Bell's interest-convergence theory is his
theory of racial sacrifice. Just as the interests of blacks are
advanced when they converge with the interests of whites, he
argues that the interest of blacks and even hard-won racial
remedies will be sacrificed or abrogated when such remedies
threaten the interests or "superior societal status of whites."7 4
Bell says this "two-sided coin, with involuntary racial sacrifice on
the one side and interest-convergent remedies on the other, can
be referred to as racialfortuity."7 5
Ultimately Bell is devastatingly pessimistic in his
assessment of the possibilities for racial equality in our nation.
He argues:
Beyond the ebb and flow of racial progress lies the still viable
and widely accepted (though seldom expressed) belief that
America is a white country in which blacks, particularly as a
group, are not entitled to the concern, resources, or even
empathy that would be extended to similarly situated whites.7 6
His pessimism, like that of Carmichael and Hamilton, is
premised on the idea that black advancement necessarily will
conflict with the interests of whites-especially those of the
upper and middle classes-and therefore such advancement
ultimately will be stymied. Alternatively, Bell's pessimism may
be grounded in his view of the permanence of racism in American
society, or as he puts it, "the obsessive need to dominate and
discriminate based on race. 77 Bell makes no attempt to account
71
72

Id. at 59.
See id. at 49-58.

" Id. at 58.

74 Id. at 69.
75 Id.; see also

id. at 29-48 (offering examples of involuntary racial sacrifice,
including the accommodation of slavery, the Dred Scott case, the Hayes-Tilden
compromise, and the southern disenfranchisement compromise).
76 Id. at 195.
77 Id. at 197; see generally BELL, supra note 7, at 197-200
(arguing that the
permanence of racism exists in American society).
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for how or whether America's growing racial complexity might
alter the phenomenon of racial fortuity he laments. Eventually,
non-Hispanic whites will not constitute a popular majority, as is
the case today in California, Hawaii, and half of our nation's
largest cities.78
Whatever the source of his pessimism, the
implicit message of Bell's interest-convergence or racial fortuity
theory is that coalition efforts between blacks and whites will
ultimately lead to disappointment or some form of sacrifice of
black interests. Bell recommends that blacks focus on selfsufficiency: 'Cast down your buckets where you are' can be a
solution if not the salvation for those working to reform and
revitalize the
ongoing crusade to overcome the debilitating effects
79
racism.
of
At the same time, Bell hints at how the interest-convergence
model can translate into useful strategy when it comes to
pursuing racial equity:
Despite its limited benefit, those who defended the University of
Michigan affirmative action plans utilized diversity as a selfinterest strategy planned for in advance rather than a happy
coincidence recognized in retrospect. Utilizing the racialfortuity model in planning and implementing civil rights
strategies may
mean relying less on the courts to advance racial
8
justice goals.
In other words, Bell seems to be suggesting that the interestconvergence model has predictive value; and it shows what can
be achieved or maintained when the self-interests of whites are
transparent and do happen to converge with those of blacks.
Still, Bell would have African Americans make strategic use of
his interest-convergence model in a highly self-sufficient way.
His final admonition to African Americans is a challenge
borrowed from Harlem activist Preston Wilcox: 'Nobody can free
us but ourselves.''

78

See MINORITY BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,

MINORITY POPULATION GROWTH: 1995 TO 2050, at 2-3 (1999) available at http://

www.mbda.gov/documents/mbdacolor.pdf.
79 BELL, supra note 5, at 194 (quoting Booker T. Washington's parable about a
ship that had been lost for many days; the crew, dying of thirst, signaled a frantic
need for water and was signaled back by a distant rescue ship to "[c]ast down your
bucket where you are," which turned out to be the fresh waters of the Amazon).
80

Id. at 200.

81

Id. at 201 (quoting Preston Wilcox).
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D. Achieving Progressivity Through Interest Group Convergence
Before I present my theory regarding interest group
convergence and coalition building, I should clarify my goal. Like
Rustin, my concern is with altering current political consensus in
a legislative or policymaking context.
Specifically, I want
progressives to recapture majoritarian politics in order to pursue
different, more progressive public policy choices, ones that give
broader opportunity to everyone and that reduce racial
inequality. In the brutal world of politics and policymaking, that
will require commanding 51% of any given policymaking or
elective vote. But to advance and sustain an entire progressive
agenda, progressives will need to cultivate enduring coalitions
that regularly command more than 51%. Again, the Civil Rights
82
Act of 1964 passed by about a 75% margin in the Senate,
attesting to the centrality of progressive politics at that time.
This puts a lot of pressure on my theory. It must inspire a great
deal of work given that progressives today often find themselves
in a minority on a given issue.
My argument builds on Bell's interest-convergence thesis,
and the insights of other writers, especially Rustin, to offer a
theory of cross-racial coalition building. I begin with the notion
that there is a kernel of truth to Bell's interest-convergence
thesis-an essential, perhaps ugly, truth about human nature.
Why should we be surprised that any social group that is in
power would act in its own self-interest, yet not act when it does
not perceive action to be in its self-interest?
As my hero
Frederick Douglass famously said, "Power concedes nothing
without a demand. It never did and it never will."83 Indeed,
82
83

See supranote 47 and accompanying text.
3 FREDERICK DOUGLASS, The Significance of Emancipation in the West Indies:

An Address Delivered in Canandaigua, New York, on 3 August 1857, in THE
FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS, SERIES ONE: SPEECHES, DEBATES, AND INTERVIEWS,

1855-1863, at 183, 204 (John W. Blassingame ed., 1985). To put the quote in full
context, Douglass stated:
Let me give you a word of the philosophy of reform. The whole history of
the progress of human liberty shows that all concessions yet made to her
august claims, have been born of earnest struggle. The conflict has been
exciting, agitating, all-absorbing, and for the time being, putting all other
tumults to silence. It must do this or it does nothing. If there is no struggle
there is no progress. Those who profess to favor freedom and yet depreciate
agitation, are men who want crops without plowing up the ground, they
want rain without thunder and lightning. They want the ocean without the
awful roar of its many waters.
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Douglass emphasized the necessity of struggle in any quest for
reform, especially one involving the freedom and uplift of
historically oppressed African Americans. 4
The civil rights
movement is a vindication of Douglass's argument. As noted
above, an intense, grassroots struggle that demanded social
change from those in political power was the only successful
route to passage of meaningful civil rights legislation. In sum,
progressives should expect struggle; toil and sacrifice will be
required to command power. And, as the interest-convergence
theory suggests, progressives should build alliances where
interests do converge and expect confrontation when they do not.
In politics and policymaking, clashes of factions or interests are
inevitable. James Madison's clear-eyed understanding of the
brutishness of majoritarian politics and the attendant risk of
majoritarian tyranny was a prescient predictor of human
behavior, especially where issues of race are involved. While I in
no way condone the hundreds of years of racial oppression of
African Americans at the hands of a dominant white majority in
this country, I do not think whites have a monopoly on this
behavior. In other contexts, where blacks constitute a popular
majority, one can find examples of similarly self-interested
behavior that disadvantages a minority group.8 5

This struggle may be a moral one, or it may be a physical one, and it may
be both moral and physical, but it must be a struggle. Power concedes
nothing without a demand. It never did and it never will. Find out just
what any people will quietly submit to and you have found out the exact
measure of injustice and wrong which will be imposed upon them, and
these will continue till they are resisted with either words or blows, or with
both.... Men may not get all they pay for in this world, but they must
certainly pay for all they get. If we ever get free from the oppressions and
wrongs heaped upon us, we must pay for their removal. We must do this by
labor, by suffering, by sacrifice, and if needs be, by our lives and the lives of
others.
Id. at 204.
8 Id.
5 In the Poletown eminent-domain case, for example, the black-led, majorityblack City of Detroit chose a white Polish neighborhood to be mowed down to make
way for a General Motors plant. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,
304 N.W.2d 455, 457 (Mich. 1981). In Prince George's County, the highest-income,
majority-black county in the United States, the black upper class attempted to erect
barriers to entry to the black lower classes, and the black and white middle classes
of that county worked together pursue policies that work to the disadvantage of the
black poor. See CASHIN, supra note 6, at 138-40. Similarly, a white college student
sent me an e-mail full of tales of woe about the bigotry and abuse she received as a
white minority at a majority-black high school she attended in Prince George's
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We are all quite capable of being tribal and primal when we
feel our fundamental interests are threatened. In fact, I would
be quite surprised-even shocked-to observe a group that is in
power voluntarily cede it in order to bring about more racial
justice or racial equality. Perhaps there are some counterexamples in human history, but the normal scenario for an
oppressed racial or ethnic minority to gain political advantage is
one where organization, protest, revolution, or open warfare or
rebellion on the part of the minority, often with the aid and
support of allies, wrested power, and hence, more racial equity,
from the dominant group. There is no doubt that individuals do
act out of motivations other than self-interest. We do charity and
volunteer work, although much charitable giving-for example,
to one's alma mater, the symphony, or elite cultural
institutions-has a self-interested dimension. In the context of
politics and policymaking, however, I believe acts against selfinterest are rare, especially on matters of racial equity.8 6
Bell's interest-convergence thesis is quite useful then. In the
ordinary, day-to-day struggle of a political or policy battle,
progressives would do better to be realistic about human nature
and strategize accordingly. There is a hopeful upside to Bell's
interest-convergence thesis: broad coalitions for progressive
social change are theoretically possible when common interests,
or a convergence of enlightened self-interest, can be established.
At the same time, I do acknowledge the moral force of the civil
rights movement and that of many issues of racial equity. The
convergence theory, like Madison's brutish assessment of human
nature, is premised on a rather impoverished view of the human
heart. I do not deny the ability of many, if not most, individuals
to act out of empathy, charity or the interests of others. I am
only arguing the core power of self-interest in the process of
County. E-mail, Identity of Author Withheld to Protect Privacy (Aug. 25, 2004,
23:53:00 EST) (on file with author).
86 Elsewhere I have written extensively about the dominance of white suburban
voters, especially in state legislative contexts, and the degree to which these voters
present obstacles to policy initiatives designed to bring about regional or racial
equity. See, e.g., Sheryll D. Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority
Poor: Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 552, 583-94
(1999) [hereinafter Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor]
(welfare reform); Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the
Favored Quarter:Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985,
2025, 2041 (2000) [hereinafter Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of
the Favored Quarter] (school finance reform and fair-share affordable housing).

2005]

SHALL WE OVERCOME?

coalition building. In this way, I draw a distinction between selfinterest in "ordinary" politics and the moral/values rhetoric of
social movements or important social moments. s7 Values and
values rhetoric do matter, as the 2004 presidential election
surely attests. I am offering an interest-convergence theory of
coalition building premised upon the idea that self-interest is a
critical strategic tool for building enduring multiracial, mixedincome alliances. At the same time, I do not deny that the
ultimate success of any progressive agenda will also require
progressive leaders to speak to people's hearts as well as their
rational self-interest.

II. TESTING THE INTEREST-CONVERGENCE THEORY OF COALITION
BUILDING: THE CHALLENGES OF MULTICULTURALISM

Below I test my theory, about how interest-convergence can
lead to progressive outcomes, against the evidence in the political
science literature. Specifically, I examine whether the theory can
work in the modern context of growing racial complexity. In
1960, about 89% of the population was white, 11% was black and
the small remainder was composed of other races.88
Today,
Latinos outnumber African Americans and demographers predict
that we will become a majority-minority nation shortly after midcentury. 89 Latinos are our fastest growing demographic group,
followed by Asians. 9° One might think that more diversity and a
declining percentage of whites would lead to more progressive
politics, but the rise of conservatism since 1964 belies this
intuition. Among the challenges to progressive coalition building
are the friction and transaction costs created by new racial
complexity and the risk of zero-sum politics prevailing over
coalition politics.
This is similar though not directly analogous to Professor Bruce Ackerman's
distinction between "ordinary" politics and the "constitutional" politics that led to
the ratification of U.S. Constitution. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
87

FOUNDATIONS 170-75 (1991) (suggesting that constitutional politics is based upon

more civic-minded, other-regarding concerns than ordinary politics).
88 See CAMPBELL GIBSON & KAY JUNG, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,

HISTORICAL

CENSUS STATISTICS ON POPULATION TOTALS BY RACE, 1790 TO 1990, AND BY
HISPANIC ORIGIN, 1970 TO 1990, FOR THE UNITED STATES, REGIONS, DIVISIONS, AND

STATES, Working Paper No. 56, tbl.A-8 (2002), available at http://www.census.gov/
population/documentation/twps0056/twpsOO56.pdf.
89 See CASHIN, supra note 6, at 90.
90 Id.
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Modern Coalition Theory: Interest vs. Ideology
The most significant debate in the political science literature
about multiracial coalitions is whether interest or ideology is the
more effective motivating force behind coalitions. Ideology is
defined as the pre-existing opinions and attitudes of a particular
racial group toward another group. 9' Interest is the recognized
tactical or strategic advantage that one racial group can gain by
forming a coalition with another group.9 2

A.

1. Interest
In their seminal book Protest Is Not Enough, political
scientists Browning, Marshall, and Tabb offer case studies of ten
California cities examined over a twenty year period. 93 They
argue the efficacy of multiracial coalitions built on self-interest.
They found that the city governments they studied were largely
unresponsive to minority interests, even when confronted with
Instead, these governments only
direct minority protest. 94
interests when new liberal,
minority
to
responsive
became
biracial coalitions were formed that defeated the existing
conservative majority white coalitions wielding the power of
elective office. Where liberal coalitions were not formed, city
government continued to be unresponsive to the demands of
racial minorities. 95 Yet, when blacks or Latinos organized a
coalition that effectively challenged the existing power structure,
policies did shift so as to benefit minority interests; a
phenomenon the researchers called "political incorporation.' 9 6
Often white liberals were a necessary component of such a
winning coalition.97
Scholars in the "interest" camp point out that coalitions
among Asians, Latinos, and blacks tend to be quite strong when
formed around issues that all three groups benefit from, such as

9' See EDUARDO BONILLA-SILVA, RACISM WITHOUT RACISTS: COLOR-BLIND
RACISM AND THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES 10

(2003).
92

See BELL, supra note 2, at 523 (describing the interest-convergence theory).
P. BROWNING ET AL., PROTEST IS NOT ENOUGH: THE STRUGGLE OF

93 RUFUS

BLACKS AND HISPANICS FOR EQUALITY IN URBAN POLITICS 3-4 (1984).
9

Id. at 8, 247.

95 Id. at 18.
96Id.

9' Id. at 245-46.
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eliminating poverty or unemployment or discrimination.9 8 The
parallel black and Chicano civil rights movements of the 1960s,
for example, were mutually reinforcing. Latinos participated in
the March on Washington in 1963 and in the Poor People's
Campaign of 1968. Many blacks supported Cesar Chavez's
campaign for farm workers. 99 However, when dealing with zerosum issues, such as political representation or public jobs,
coalitions tend to break down into racial antagonism. In other
words, where interests clearly diverge, multiracial coalitions are
much less probable.'0 0 However, even when forming coalitions
with blacks is in their interest, Latinos and Asians are reluctant
to do so, due to racial stereotypes that they harbor about blacks.
Ideology thus plays some role, even in an interest-based theory.' '
2.

Ideology

Not surprisingly, Browning, Marshall, and Tabb's important
work around interest-convergence and multiracial coalitions
spawned a contrary book suggesting that ideology is a stronger
incentive for successful coalition building, and, more negatively,
where the ideologies of coalition groups conflict, it is very difficult
to build or sustain a multiracial coalition. Historically, "racial
ideology" has been one of the strongest disincentives to interSome argue that ideology explains why
group cooperation.
blacks have difficulty forming coalitions with other minority
groups.'0 2 For example, although blacks and Latinos share many
common interests, Latinos tend to identify themselves much
more with whites, according to surveys. 03 In a study of various
school districts, two researchers found that Latinos formed
coalitions with whites rather than with blacks, despite the fact
that more whites were opposed to Latino incorporation and

98 McClain & Tauber, supra note 66, at 113-14.
9 See id. at 113. My first brush with such coalition politics occurred on a
grocery shopping trip when I was a child. My activist mother who, like me, was
African American, would not buy grapes that did not bear the farm workers union
sticker. Much to my chagrin, this sometimes meant I could not have grapes.
100 See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
'01 McClain & Tauber, supra note 66, at 129.
102 See, e.g., Sonenshein, supra note 66, at 44.
103 John H. Mollenkopf, New York: The Great Anomaly, in RACIAL POLITICS IN
AMERICAN CITIES, supra note 66, at 75, 82; Carlos Mufioz, Jr. & Charles Henry,
Coalition Politics in San Antonio and Denver: The Cisneros and Pefia Mayoral

Campaigns,in RACIAL POLITICS IN AMERICAN CITIES, supra note 66, at 179, 188.
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adoption of Latino issues.' 4 While this lends credence to the idea
that interest is not as powerful an influence as a racial ideology,
it also demonstrates that whites are not passive in the face of
multiracial coalitions; racial ideology will often be exploited.
Some researchers argue that convergence of ideology is a
necessary element for a multiracial coalition, although it is not
sufficient by itself. Interest plays a role as well; if there is a
significant interest conflict, these scholars argue, it will overcome
ideological harmony and dissolve any coalition. For example,
although white liberals and blacks have a long history of forming
coalitions in New York City, black attempts to penetrate the
stranglehold white liberals had on public jobs during the late
1960s collapsed the coalition. 5 On the other hand, ideological
unity can overcome a minor interest conflict or the absence of any
interest at all. Leadership, however, is vital to the formation of
any coalition. Political groups can be persuaded by leadership.
The determination of group leaders to build and improve
relations among their respective racial groups has a tremendous
impact on the formation of coalitions.
Overcoming interest
conflicts to form coalitions based on ideology, or vice versa, is a
burden ultimately placed on
the leadership, and it requires
06
diplomatic and political skill.
Beyond racial ideology, there are other significant challenges
to multiracial coalition building. First, coalitions are unlikely to
form in areas where one ethnic group is dominant, since the
dominant group does not need partners. Second, with the
disappearance of manufacturing jobs and cuts in federal aid to
cities, minorities may find themselves struggling over fewer
resources. In such a climate, multiracial coalitions, although
relatively easy to form around issues of poverty and education,
are more difficult to sustain around issues of political
representation, public jobs, and other zero-sum issues.' 7

104 See Kenneth J. Meier & Joseph Stewart, Jr., Cooperation and Conflict in

MultiracialSchool Districts, 53 J. OF POL. 1123, 1132 (1991) (examining politics in
118 multiracial urban school districts and finding that "Anglo-Latino" coalitions are
more likely to be formed than "Black-Latino" coalitions).
'0SSee, e.g., Sonenshein, supra note 66, at 199-200.
'0' See id. at 203-06.
'07 See generally Michael Jones-Correa,
Structural Shifts and Institutional
Capacity: Possibilities for Ethnic Cooperation and Conflict in Urban Settings, in

GOVERNING AMERICAN CITIES, supra note 66, at 183 (2001).
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The evidence from the political science literature presented
above suggests that interest-convergence is useful, but a
divergence of either interest or ideology will present major
challenges. Below I turn to more recent literature and actual
examples of successful multiracial coalitions.
The ultimate
question is whether there is enough evidence of success with
interest-based coalitions to suggest that such efforts are
worthwhile. I conclude that there is.
3.

Recent Thinking
Paul Osterman, in his book Gathering Power,10 8 offers a
detailed case study on the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF),
praising the positive impact that such interest-based coalitions
can have on progressive politics in urban areas.'0 9 Noted
sociologist William J. Wilson is similarly enamored of the IAF,
and argues that national multiracial coalitions could shift
national policy into a permanent progressivism. " ° The IAF's
avoidance of racial issues has been touted as a major factor in its
success.
By focusing on race-neutral issues and engaging
constituents based upon self-interest, the IAF believes it can
appeal to a much broader constituency. It is extraordinarily
effective; its local affiliates are responsible for thousands of
community improvements.' '
An alternative to engaging different racial groups directly in
terms of their self-interest or avoiding race is to explicitly discuss
race. Wilson argues, for example, that the proper strategy is not
to avoid discussing racially charged issues, like affirmative
action, but to reframe it as a program benefiting all races." 2 This
is similar to the work of Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres. They
argue in The Miner's Canary"13 that race, or the condition of the
most marginalized racial minority, should be used as a diagnostic
14
for understanding how some social systems harm everyone.'
108 OSTERMAN, supra note 38.
109.See generally id.
"0 See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE BRIDGE OVER THE RACIAL

DIVIDE: RISING INEQUALITY AND COALITION POLITICS 85-92 (1999).
...See generally OSTERMAN, supra note 38, at 75-81.
112 WILSON, supra note 110, at 115.
..
3 LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER'S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE,
RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY (2002).
114 Id.
at 29, 31, 82-86 (stating that racial literacy is sharing one's personal
racial experience for the benefit and education of those within and without the
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Ultimately, recent scholars agree that multiracial coalitions can
form when racial groups have a common interest that is
significant enough to overcome any ideological differences.
However, such coalitions are best maintained when both interest
and ideology converge.
Many black scholars, like Bell, are highly pessimistic about
our ability to overcome racial ideology. Black academics and
regular folk are well aware of current and historic racial hostility
exhibited toward African Americans and this, no doubt, fuels
their skepticism.1 5 As my friend and colleague john powell likes
to say:
"Pessimists
are former optimists who have been
6
disappointed."' 1
Despite the challenges, I believe progressives have no
alternative but to pursue coalitions with potential allies. Selfhelp or self-sufficiency, the "cast down your bucket" philosophy of
Booker T. Washington, most recently advocated by Bell," 7 is not
mutually exclusive with coalition building. In fact, organizing in
black communities fits with and enhances the possibilities for a
successful, reenergized progressive majority. As I describe below,
a necessary element of effective coalition building is to work
through existing local organizations and institutions. But selfsufficiency, standing alone, will not alter legislative outcomes, as
any member of the Congressional Black or Hispanic Caucus can
attest.
B.

Shall We Overcome? TranscendingDifference

I acknowledge that the chief obstacle to multiracial coalition
building is the persistence of negative stereotypes held about
certain groups. The strongest antipathy/stereotype seems to be
about blacks.
Other groups are more easily accepted or
assimilated into society and hence into multiracial coalitions. I
am utterly realistic about this challenge."'
Many immigrant
class).
"5
Bayard Rustin suggested of Stokely Carmichael's pessimism that it was
borne of the scores of physical beatings he endured as a nonviolent protestor during
the civil rights movement. See Rustin, supra note 58, at 38.
116 powell, who intentionally uses lower case with his name, said this at a panel

on residential integration that we both appeared on during a conference on building
integrated communities. john powell, Remarks at a Panel Discussion at the Open
Society (Oct. 22, 2004).
117 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
118 See Leonard M. Baynes, If It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, Why Does
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groups have internalized racist or stereotypical views about
blacks.' 19 The inter-group relational dynamics surrounding the
civil rights movement have changed. Direct, violent oppression
of southern blacks in the Jim Crow era provided a clear moral
imperative, at least for some, and a willingness of civil rights
allies to have blacks act as the senior partner in the coalition
effort. Examples of successful coalitions in some California cities
offered by Browning, Marshall, and Tabb mirror the traditional
civil rights model of the 1960s. 20 But rapid diversification of the
American population has changed this model of inter-group
relations. Emerging ethnic and minority groups that are newer
to the realm of politics and legislative advocacy are not much
interested in a coalition model in which another group leads, nor
are they very interested in aligning with blacks, in part because
they perceive them as an entrenched political power. 12 1 Still, in
the most diverse of places-frequently large urban centers-the
reality of growing racial diversity is that it is increasingly
unlikely that a single racial group can succeed independently. In
such diverse environments, coalition building is the imperative
route to political power. Diversity can be a source of power if
The risk with ever-complex diversity,
properly harnessed.
however, is that the administrative costs of inter-group
negotiations and the potential for conflict increases with each
This is
new group or interest that must be incorporated.
Darkness Cast a Longer Discriminatory Shadow than Lightness? An Investigation
and Analysis of the Color Hierarchy, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 131, 132-33 (1997)
(discussing the disparity of discrimination between light-skinned and dark-skinned
people); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Law and Economics of CriticalRace
Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1757, 1762, 1802-03 (2003) (suggesting that diversity in the
workplace means most minorities must be assimilated to be included). This goes
beyond race to hair textures, skin color, etc. See also CASHIN, supra note 6, at 9-12
(noting that all non-black groups show a consistent antipathy to residential
integration with blacks, and that blacks are the group with which whites, Latinos,
and Asians are most reluctant to integrate); Jerry Kang, Denying Prejudice:
Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA L. REV. 933, 956 (2004).
"19 In New York City, 70% of cabdrivers are non-white immigrants, at least 50%
of whom are south Asian. That noted African American actor and activist Danny
Glover has difficulty hailing a cab in this multicultural metropolis speaks volumes
about the degree to which immigrants have incorporated fear and stereotypes about
black men into their thinking. See McClain & Tauber, supra note 66, at 132.
120 See Rufus P. Browning et al., Minority Mobilization in Ten Cities: Failures
and Successes, in RACIAL POLITICS IN AMERICAN CITIES, supra note 66, at 8, 10-14.
121 See, e.g., Edward J.W. Park & John S.W. Park, Korean Americans and the
Crisis of the Liberal Coalition: Immigrants and Politics in Los Angeles, in
GOVERNING AMERICAN CITIES, supra note 66, at 91, 91-93, 104.
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compounded by the risk of zero-sum perceptions, in which a gain
for one group means a corresponding loss to another, and the
sheer difficulty of establishing inter-group communication and
understanding is demonstrated. 2 2 .
1.

Transcending Difference Through Interest- Convergence

So how do we transcend race, class, and ideology, especially
racial ideology? Let me begin with a story of how one local
affiliate of the IAF-Dallas Area Interfaith (DAI)-overcame
racial ideology to build a multiracial coalition that succeeded in
changing the policy direction concerning public education in
Dallas to a progressive course. Started by a group of black,
white, and Latino ministers and local leaders, DAI transcends
stereotyping by organizing around people's interests rather than
their fears. It remains cohesive in part by refusing to meet
unless membership of all three ethnic groups, blacks, whites, and
Latinos, are present. 123 By frontally challenging the way certain
public officials had been exploiting racial divisions, DAI was
responsible for getting the City of Dallas as well as Dallas
Independent School District (DISD) to create, and later increase,
funding for after-school programs throughout the school district.
Even more impressive, DAI was largely responsible for passage
of a $1.4 billion school bond initiative. They succeeded first by
breaking up a coalition of white and Latino members of the
Dallas school board known as the "slam-dunk group."'24
Consistent with political science research concerning other school
boards throughout the nation, the white and Latino members of
the board had operated as a voting block that frequently opposed
the black members of the board.'2 5 DAI was able to turn out
large numbers of community leaders at school board meetings; it
persuaded the Latino members of the school board to ally with
black board members to support the after-school program that
white members had opposed.
The school board ultimately
appropriated more money than DAI had originally requested for
the program and brought about the demise of the slam-dunk
122

See, e.g., CASHIN, supra note 6, at 70-78 (underscoring the communication

and other challenges to cultivating successful integrated communities
institutions).
123 See OSTERMAN, supra note 38, at 77.
124 See id. at 78.
125 See id.; see also Meier & Stewart, supra note 104, at 1126-28.
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coalition.' 26 Osterman explains how DAI was able to win the
even larger victory of a school bond referendum and transcend
Dallas's "troubled racial politics":
By 2001 the Dallas Independent School District had one-quarter
of its students in portable or temporary buildings yet for the
past decade had been unable to pass a bond initiative. The
superintendent, Mike Moses, was determined to make an effort
but was unsure of his political support. The turning point was
an assembly organized by DAI with sixteen hundred people and
Mike Moses attending. The success of the assembly preempted
opposition to the bond, and following the assembly Moses not
only proposed one but increased the amount from $900 million
to $1.4 billion. DAI participated in the campaign via a get-outthe-vote effort aimed at the Hispanic community, and the bond
overwhelmingly passed. In an education conference in the
publicly credited DAI for
winter of 2002, Superintendent1 Moses
27
election.
bond
the
of
the success
The success of the DAI is not accidental. Built on the
pioneering work of Saul Alinsky, all IAF affiliates follow the
same principles: community organization that focuses around a
coalition of institutions, usually churches, but also unions,
2
By focusing on
education associations, and other groups.1 '
members that
of
flow
institutions, IAF tries to avoid the ebb and
occurs when organizing people, since people get tired, move, or
die. Institutions are more stable, and provide a more stable and
larger base of financial and labor support. IAF affiliates also
draw from all racial, ethnic, and income groups in their
respective metropolitan regions. Most importantly, they give low
and moderate income people a real voice in their operations,
2 9 IAF
training them how to be leaders for their community.
affiliates tend to focus on practical solutions for community
problems: issues that cut across potential racial divides, often
involving public schools, housing, youth, day care, or
transportation. Most importantly, IAF leaders frankly accept
self-interest as the driving motivation for all parties involved in
politics. Alinsky insisted that the only basis on which long-term
stable organizations could be built was to found them on the selfOSTERMAN, supra note 38, at 78.
Id.
Id. at 93, 185.

126 See
127
121

129 Id. at 42-47.
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interest of their participants.'3 0 Hence, IAF teaches its members
how to identify self-interest and use it strategically. ' As the
example of DAI demonstrates, this strategy has proved
successful, sometimes enormously so, in enabling IAF affiliates to
alter the political status quo and move policymakers to a
32
progressive course.
There are other heartening examples of organizations that
are transcending differences through interest-convergence. The
Gamaliel Foundation, for example, sponsors approximately fifty
mostly church-based interfaith coalitions of suburban and inner
city groups that are seriously attacking issues of racial and
regional inequity. 133 Motivated by Alexis de Tocqueville's keen
observation that the lifeblood of American democracy was the
ability of citizens to form associations to address the issues dear
to them, Gamaliel is committed to redressing the race and class
divides in metropolitan regions. Its "mass based organizing" is
explicitly designed to bring together poor and working class
urban communities with suburban communities. 34 In contrast to
the Alinsky/JAF model, Gamaliel affiliates do not shirk from
discussing racial issues. However, they use a "regional analysis"
in assessing questions of inequity and setting public policy
goals. 35 Gamaliel has fostered the creation of "a new kind of
peoples organization":
metropolitan-wide coalitions of local
institutions that can marshal thousands of individuals "to agitate
around tax base inequity, transportation, housing and regional
investment policies that [drain] the cities and working class
Id. at 67.
131Id. at 51.
130

An exemplar is the Greater Boston Interfaith Organization (GBIO) which led
a state-wide campaign that won passage in the state legislature of a $100 million
Housing Trust Fund in 2000. GBIO worked successfully for a $30 million annual
increase in state capital budget for housing. It won a $2 million increase in funding
for Boston Public Schools for textbooks and instructional supplies. It secured a $23
million commitment in new funding for affordable housing from the City of Boston.
It raised a $6 million loan fund at 0% interest to finance the construction of
Nehemiah homes affordable to average working families. It organized with the
Justice for Janitor's campaign to win significant pay and benefit increases for area
janitors. See Greater Boston Interfaith Organization, Key Achievements, at
http://www.gbio.org (last visited Apr. 13, 2005).
133 See
Gamaliel
Foundation,
Gamaliel Foundation History,
at
http://www.gamaliel.org/foundation/history.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
134 See Gamaliel Foundation, Gamaliel FoundationStrategic
Plan:2000 through
2010, at http://www.gamaliel.org/foundation/goals.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
135Id.
132
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'136
suburbs to subsidize the new and growing rich communities."
Implicit in this regional analysis, and the targeting of working
class suburbs as the natural allies of city dwellers, is the idea of
interest-convergence. The inner-ring of older suburbs culturally
may identify with the more affluent, job-rich outer-ring suburbs,
but their fiscal destiny is much more similar to that of central
cities. Both types of communities suffer from disproportionate
public and private investment in outer-ring suburbs and they
both carry more than their fair share of modest housing and
social distress. 3 7 In some metropolitan regions, leaders have
this convergence of city and
formed coalitions precisely around
1 38
interests.
inner-ring suburban
Gamaliel's model of regional organization "allows people to
organize across the artificial lines of race and political
jurisdiction that have been created to insure that people remain
With such mass-based regional
divided and ineffective.,' 39
organizations already operating in scores of metropolitan regions,
Gamaliel is committed to initiating a similar regional effort in
every major population center in the country by 2010. Gamaliel
is refreshingly old-styled in its approach. Its metropolitan
organizations rely on the power of "numbers and strategic action
4 ° In other words, a Gamaliel
to win major issue campaigns."'
organization operating in a major metropolitan area will
commonly have as many as one hundred to two hundred member
institutions and be able to organize anywhere from two thousand
to five thousand people to show up at a given public policy venue
4
or event to advocate for a progressive course. '

Id.
See Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter,
supra note 86, at 2020-21.
"' See id. at 2034-36 (citing the example of the Twin Cities Metropolitan region
and the coalition formed between central city and declining blue collar suburbs,
which formed a majority in the state legislature that resulted, inter alia, in the
passage of tax base sharing, fair-share affordable housing, regional land use
planning, and metropolitan governance).
139 Gamaliel Foundation, Gamaliel Foundation Strategic Plan: 2000 through
2010, at http://www.gamaliel.org/foundation/goals.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
136

137

140

Id.

Id. In the Detroit metropolitan area, for example, one of the driving forces
behind the creation of a new multi-county regional transit authority was a
multiracial, city-suburban church based organization and Gamaliel affiliate known
as MOSES (Metropolitan Organizing Strategy Enabling Strength). A new regional
entity that will provide greater transportation access and connection between the
inner city of Detroit and its surrounding suburbs is an important feat for one of the
141
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Another, perhaps better known example of a multiracial,
multi-class coalition formed around a convergence of interest
concerns the passage of the "Texas 10 Percent Plan." This
legislation guarantees admission to the flagship public
universities of Texas to graduating seniors in the top 10 % of
every high school in the state.'4 2 The program, developed by a
group of Latino and black activists, legislators, and academics,
passed in the Texas legislature by one vote, after conservative
Republican rural members whose constituents were not regularly
being admitted to University of Texas decided to support the
legislation.1 43
Elsewhere I have offered other examples of
multiracial coalitions comprised of groups that are seemingly
strange bedfellows that were formed based upon mutual,
enlightened self-interest, an understanding that can be created
through the artful dissemination of empirical data. 144
The IAF, Gamaliel, and Texas examples confirm what my
interest-convergence theory suggests: that a more enlightened
understanding of self-interest can form the basis for powerful
new coalitions that transcend race, class, and ideology. In my
view, there are at least three necessary ingredients to creating
such transcending scenarios: (1) leadership; (2) data; and (3)
grassroots organization. First, leaders of existing institutions
representing different racial, ethnic, and economic groups that
should be allies must form a coalition that works to build
enduring relationships and trust among themselves and their
constituent members. Second, such coalition building will be
aided by objective empirical research and data, preferably
geographically mapped, that underscores powerfully to different
constituencies where their enlightened self-interest lies on a
given public policy issue. Third, grassroots efforts by strong local
organizations that teach leadership and coalition building skills,
educate, and mobilize people must occur. It is not surprising, for
example, that progressive politics has declined as the labor
movement and local machine politics have declined because it

most racially segregated regions of the country. See Myron Orfield, Comment on
Scott A. Bollen's "In Through the Back Door: Social Equity and Regional
Governance," 13 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 659, 662 (2003).
142 See GUINIER & TORRES, suprta note 113, at 72.
143

Id. at 68-73.

1" See CASHIN, supra note 6, at 304-17 (summarizing the work of regionalist,
community development, and smart growth organizations).
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committed to
has resulted in a loss of local institutions
45
people.'
mobilize
can
that
progressive politics
It remains to be seen whether leadership, coupled with
grassroots organizing around empirically supported evidence of
self-interest, will be powerful enough in most circumstances to
overcome racial ideology. The recent migration of the white
working class to a Republican party that has focused heavily on
giving tax relief to the affluent suggests the ease with which both
racial and cultural ideology can be exploited to overcome what
would seem like rational self-interest. We certainly have a long
history of exploitation of racial ideology for the purpose of
advancing the interests of the corporate classes by disrupting
possibilities for strong alliances between working class and poor
46 It is much easier to exploit racial
whites and people of color.'
tensions than to build coalitions that transcend those tensions.
The hopeful examples of successful multiracial coalitions I
have offered suggest to me that such transcendence is possible, or
at least the many diverse places marked by an absence of strong
progressive coalitions do not suggest that my theory is wrong.
For me, it suggests merely that this work is difficult and labor
intensive. It is also essential. As we celebrate and reflect on the
successes (and unmet promises) of the civil rights movement, we
cannot ignore those factors that made the movement possible. A
transcendent social order cannot and will not be achieved
without the hard work of grassroots mobilization. Progressive,
majority power will not be achieved without expanding our
numbers. While the path of least resistance is to work solely
within single issue, or single identity, organizations and
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See OSTERMAN, supra note 38, at 16-17, 21. Meanwhile conservatism has

ascended with the rise of grassroots organization among growing, local and healthy
institutions committed to politically and socially conservative ideas. Id. at 20-21. In
the 2004 presidential election, for example, President George W. Bush may have
doubled his percentage with African American voters because he connected with
black Christians through Christian conservative networks. See Jim Dwyer & Jodi
Wilgoren, Gore and Kerry Unite in Search for Black Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2004,
at Al.
146 See, e.g., BELL, supra note 5, at 41-44 (discussing how the populist agrarian
movements in the nineteenth century moved away from alliance with black farmers
to racial rhetoric, and how Jim Crow segregation was an accommodation by white
elites of the desires of working class whites in order to mask their own exploitation).
Such exploitation is reflected in the Republican party's southern strategy, and racecoded modern politics.
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communities, progressives will be increasingly disempowered if
they fail to organize the constituencies about whom they care.
At the same time, progressives need to develop empathy for
the seeming stranger who might become a bedfellow. They
should not write off the white working class guy, the so-called
"NASCAR dad," who may seem at first blush to be too far across
a cultural divide to cultivate. Nor should they write off any
racial, ethnic, or class constituency whose interests would seem
to converge with a progressive agenda. Instead progressives
should develop the language and data to engage every potential
ally. In my view, this is the only way progressivism will return
to the mainstream of American politics.
CONCLUSION

When Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote his famous Letter from
a Birmingham Jail on April 16, 1963, he was responding not just
to eight Alabama clergymen who had published a statement in
the local newspaper criticizing the timing and wisdom of the
Birmingham demonstration, but also to the many detractors of
direct mass protest, including traditional civil rights
organizations. King, like Frederick Douglass before him, knew
"through painful experience that freedom is never voluntarily
given by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the oppressed."'147
At the same time, King was "cognizant of the interrelatedness of
all communities and states" and the "inescapable network of
mutuality" we live in. 48 He dared to believe that "our feardrenched communities" could one day radiate with "love and
brotherhood."' 149 If King had accepted the pessimism of so many
progressives today, he never would have written that letter and
persevered in his belief that a different social order could be
brought about. 5 ° He never would have bothered to form SCLC,
then a coalition of eighty-five local organizations committed to
combating racial injustice.' 5
141 Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham
City Jail, in CML
DISOBEDIENCE IN FOCUS 68, 72 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1991).
148 Id.
at 69.
149

Id. at 84.

john powell made this statement at a panel on residential integration that
we both appeared on during a conference on building integrated communities. john
powell, Remarks at a Panel Discussion at the Open Society (Oct. 22, 2004).
...See King, supra note 147, at 68 (noting that he served as president of SCLC,
which had "some eighty-five affiliate organizations all across the South" that "share
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Dramatic change is inevitable as a result of growing
diversity. The only question is this: Will progressives harness
that dramatic change and do the hard work of building alliances
across boundaries of difference, or will we continue to despair at
the status quo, while others organize and continue to divide us
from people and interest groups who could be our natural allies?
In light of the exemplary multiracial, multi-class coalitions that
have succeeded in moving policymakers to a progressive course, I,
too, dare to be optimistic about our diverse future.

staff, educational and financial resources").
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